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Sub-Saharan Africa consists of countries regarded as underdeveloped or developing and is
part of the so-called Third World. Third World countries share many characteristics but at the
continental level they are not the same. For instance, sub-Saharan Africa is sparsely
populated, in contrast to South and East Asia, and it is much less urbanized than Latin
America. It stands out among the other major regions of the Third World as having the
slowest rate of economic growth in recent years: an average annual growth rate of gross
domestic product of 2.4 per cent between 1980 and 1990 compared to 3.0 per cent in South
Asia, 4.3 in Middle East and North Africa and 3.1 per cent in Latin America during the same
period; its population growth is outstripping that of food production and also it is politically
Balkanized, consisting of a large number of countries most of which are small and at an early
stage of development. There are 50 of them, including South Africa and British Indian Ocean
Territory. The latter is excluded from the discussion for lack of demographic information
while the former will not figure much for a number of reasons. We know more about the
demographic profiles of the other countries of the region than we do about South Africa.
Reports on the methodology of studies conducted in South Africa are not published and major
questions on coverage, sampling methods, response rates and other factors remain
unanswered (Caldwell and Caldwell 1993).
Sub-Saharan Africa emerged from the second World War with a total estimated
population of 181 million in 1950, and an annual growth rate of 2.2 per cent. The population
doubled within the following 27 years (1950-1977) and the annual growth rate climbed to 3.0
per cent. The expansion of the population has continued unabated, reaching 531 million in
1990 and it is estimated to rise to 739 million by the end of the century with the doubling
period reduced to 23 years and the rate of growth increasing to 3.4 per cent per year. The third
doubling of the population will occur within the next 18 years with an estimated number of
1.5 billion people and a growth rate of 3.8 per cent per year. Except for South Africa,
Mauritius, Guinea Bissau, Chad and war-torn countries such as Angola, Somalia and
Mozambique, the populations of most of the countries accelerated at average annual rates of
2.6 per cent and over between 1980 and 1992. Among the countries with such high rates of
growth are Botswana (3.4), Kenya (3.6), Congo (3.4), Zambia (3.8), Cameroon (3.5), C“te
d’Ivoire (3.8), Zaïre (3.3), Tanzania (3.0), Comoros (3.7), Nigeria (3.3), Niger (3.3), Uganda
(3.0), Mali (3.2), Zimbabwe (3.3), Ethiopia (3.1) and Togo (3.3) (World Bank 1994). Over the
past two decades the number of countries growing at rates of 3.0 per cent and over increased
from seven to 16.
 Why are the growth rates so high? Since World War I, medical and public health
technologies have been made available to virtually all countries in the subcontinent whatever
the level of economic development. With the introduction of antibiotics, antimalarial spraying
and increased use of vaccination, the decline in mortality accelerated in the 1950s and spread
to all countries. Driven by falling mortality and continued high fertility, the growth rate rose
from two per cent per annum in the 1950s to three per cent per annum in 1994. The current
population growth in sub-Saharan Africa is a phenomenon for which the economic and
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demographic history of mankind offers no real precedent. Birth rates are above 40 per
thousand and have changed very little or not at all. The total fertility rates range from between
four and five in Zimbabwe and Botswana to six or more children per woman in the remainder
of the countries. On the other hand, all the countries in the subcontinent have experienced
significant declines in their death rates over the past 35 years except for Malawi, Sierra
Leone, Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique where the rates are estimated to be 20 or
more deaths per thousand population.
Table 1
Population growth in 29 sub-Saharan African countries: 1980 to 1980-1992
Average annual rate
of growth (per cent)
Number of countries
1980 1992
<2   1   1
2.0-2.4   8   3
2.5-2.9 13   9
3.0-3.5   3 14
>3   4   2
Total 29 29
Source: World Bank 1994
In this process of change demographic transition theory may be used to simplify the
complex relationships between population growth and economic development. The theory
consists of a generally accepted body of concepts about how the world or a country behaves
demographically. It attempts to explain why all contemporary developed countries have more
or less passed through the same three stages of demographic change over time. According to
the original version of the theory, each population passes through three broad stages: Pre-
industrial, Transitional and Industrial-urbanized. The pre-industrial stage is characterized by a
regime of high mortality and high fertility while the transitional stage is one with low
mortality and high fertility. Because the decline of mortality precedes the decline in fertility,
there is a period during which population grows rapidly. As time goes by, however, fertility
begins to decline and the reduction in the level of fertility continues until the country’s
population growth stabilizes at low levels of fertility and mortality. Although no two countries
behave alike, none appears to become urban-industrial without passing through or at least
entering the demographic transition.
The classic model, which may be labelled Demographic Transition Type 1, was closely
associated with the Industrial Revolution and was essentially completed by the end of World
War I followed by the Type 2 model. This is characteristic of countries moving through the
entire trajectory much more rapidly than did the older industrial countries. The drop in
mortality is more abrupt, and the fall in fertility, beginning from a higher level, is faster once
it gets under way. As a result, the growth of population is two to three times what it was
historically in Type 1.
As a model for predicting the future, the demographic transition has undeniable
limitations and it is therefore less satisfactory for making population projections. However,
for purposes of understanding what is going on, the theory of demographic transition still
offers the best starting point. At the end of World War I, a group of Asian countries, Japan,
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, faced a bleak future. Their economies had
traditionally been heavily dependent on agriculture, yet land was very scarce. Consequently,
their population density was extremely high. Japan managed to move through most of its
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demographic transition while other countries struggled with labour intensive activity that
supported high numbers of people at or near the subsistence level. These countries, however,
developed with incredible speed. On the demographic side, their total fertility rate fell from
between five and seven children per woman to below replacement level within a relatively
short period of 35 years, from 1950 to 1985 (see Leete and Alam 1993:20). If these countries
could quickly reach a fertility rate of less than two children per woman, can others do it too,
despite the starting conditions? Will they serve as a model for the rest of the developing
world? Or will it prove impossible for many poor countries, particularly in sub-Saharan
Africa, to travel that path?
Nearly all the countries are at the second stage of the demographic transition with high
population growth rates well over 2.5 per cent per year. Notwithstanding, most countries are
experiencing high infant and child and general death rates because of the persistence of
widespread poverty and low levels of living. The latter are also perpetuating high birth rates
and general population growth rates remain relatively high. Even in countries such as Kenya,
Zimbabwe and Botswana where fertility is reported to be on the decline, the current levels of
fertility are fairly high and population growth rates are high, 3.4 per cent in Botswana, 3.6 per
cent in Kenya and 3.3 per cent in Zimbabwe (World Bank 1994). As we progress towards the
end of the twentieth century, an important question is when and under what conditions are the
African countries likely to experience significant mortality and fertility declines and slow
population growth?
No one knows the answer, but from the demographic point of view the options are few.
The rapid expansion of population in the subcontinent may have to stop somehow. It may stop
because of a return to high mortality due to malnutrition, famine and poverty, conflicts
(especially over land and resources) or other disaster perhaps stemming from the ‘Tragedy of
the Commons’ or AIDS. Or it may be stopped as a result of a continuous decline in fertility to
a low level, a condition possibly brought on by unbearable costs of childbearing due to the
economic crisis. In what follows an attempt is made to assess the two major components of
the demographic transition, mortality and fertility.
Mortality transition
As noted earlier on, medical and health technologies accelerated the decline in mortality
during the 1950s and 1960s. The mortality rate for children under the age of five has been cut
by half and life expectancy increased by more than a decade between 1956 and 1980. Infant
mortality dropped to below 100 per thousand live births between 1970 and 1992 in fewer than
half of the countries for which data are available (see Table 3). It is still relatively high in all
countries except Botswana, Zimbabwe and Lesotho.
During the mid-1950s only one in seven Africans had access to safe drinking water, but
25 years later about half of the African population was obtaining drinking water from a safe
source. By the end of the 1980s nearly half of all Africans could reach a modern health care
facility within two hours.
Despite these achievements, however, life expectancy in Africa was only 52 years in
1992 compared with 64 years for all developing countries and 77 years for industrialized
countries (UNDP 1993). The persistence of high mortality is reflected in figures presented in
Table 2. In three-quarters of the countries, life expectancy at birth is less than 56 years and
only three countries, South Africa, Lesotho, and Botswana, have average life expectancy of
more than 60 years.
Africa’s infant mortality rate is 1.5 times higher than in all developing countries and eight
times higher than in industrialized countries. Within the continent, mortality differentials
between and within countries are no less striking: mortality of children under five ranges from
254 deaths per thousand live births in Malawi, Mali and Sierra Leone to below 100 in
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Zimbabwe and Botswana. Adult mortality, the risk of dying between ages 15 and 60, has been
estimated to range from 18 per cent in Northern Sudan to as high as 58 per cent in Sierra
Leone. In many countries, more than 30 per cent of females and 40 per cent of males of
working age will die before the age of 60 (UNDP 1993).
Table 2
Expectation of life at birth 1992
Expectation of life at birth Number of countries
<45   6
45-49 12
50-55   9
56-60   6
>60   3
Total 36
Source: World Bank 1994
Table 3
Decline in infant mortality rates (per 1,000 live births) in African countries-1992
COUNTRY 1970 1992 DECLINE
(%)
COUNTRY 1970 1992 DECLINE
(%)
Botswana 101 35 65 Mauritania 165 117 29
Benin 155 110 29 Mauritius 79 53 33
Burundi 182 129 29 Malawi 193 134 31
Burkina Faso 178 132 26 Mozambique 156 162 4
Cameroon 126 61 52 Namibia 118 57 52
C.A.R. 139 105 24 Niger 170 123 28
Chad 171 122 29 Nigeria 139 84 40
C“te d’lvoire 135 91 33 Rwanda 142 117 18
Congo 126 114 10 Sierra Leone 197 143 27
Ethiopia 158 122 23 Somalia 158 132 16
Gabon 138 94 54 South Africa 79 53 33
Ghana 111 81 27 Sudan 149 99 34
Guinea 181 133 27 Tanzania 132 92 30
Guinea
Bissau 185 140 24 Uganda 109 122 12
Kenya 102 66 35 Zambia 106 107 1
Lesotho 134 46 66 Zimbabwe 96 47 51
Madagascar 181 93 49 Zaire 158 96 49
Mali 204 130 36
Source: World Bank 1994
Mortality differentials within countries are strong indicators of the prevailing inequalities
in health status between urban and rural residence and among socio-economic groups. In
Zimbabwe, for example, childhood mortality of urban residents is 45 per cent below levels in
rural areas, and among urban dwellers in the Sudan, Togo and Uganda it is up to 20 per cent
below rural levels. Children of married women with secondary education are 25 - 50 per cent
less likely to die than children of women who have no formal schooling. Ethnicity also ranks
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as a strong correlate of infant and childhood mortality differentials, even after controlling for
education and occupation. At all levels of statistical aggregation, therefore, huge gaps are
apparent in key health indicators.
Perinatal conditions and infectious and parasitic diseases are responsible for 75 per cent
of infant deaths. Infectious and parasitic diseases are further responsible for 71 per cent of the
deaths of 1-4 year-olds, 62 per cent of the deaths of children aged 5-14 years, and 53 per cent
of adult deaths. Among older adults, cancer and circulatory system diseases prevail among
those aged 45-64 years, and 65 years and older (World Bank 1991). Maternal mortality in
Africa is very high and health problems are compounded by lack of frequent gynaecological
checkups and care, and delay in treatment when infections occur. Africa also has the highest
adolescent pregnancy rate in the world. Childhood mortality and morbidity are of particular
concern because children are among the most vulnerable groups. Childhood health in Africa is
threatened mostly by infectious diseases, particularly diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections,
malaria and measles.
The structure of the causes of death indicates the lack of profound structural changes in
the African socio-medical systems. A significant shift in the existing structure would require
substantial improvements in agricultural and infrastructural capacity: safe water supply,
sanitation, nutrition and especially education, which appears to influence some aspects of
social behaviour including child care and reproduction. In some Asian countries where infant
mortality has declined substantially, changes have occurred not only in the medical and health
systems, for example in child care, but also in the social and economic conditions such as
nutrition, standard of education and the level and distribution of income. Health conditions are
therefore closely interrelated with the levels of socio-economic development, with public
health programs and also with cultural beliefs and attitudes towards illness.
Infrastructural facilities
Access to clean water and sanitation significantly reduces mortality and morbidity. Many
areas in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly the rural areas where the majority of the people live,
are without safe water and are subject to insanitary surroundings with extremely limited
transport and communication. Except in Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe, C“te d’Ivoire
and Burkina Faso, less than 50 per cent of the sub-Saharan African population has access to
safe water; the situation is even worse in the rural areas where more than 70 per cent of the
population are unable to consume clean water (World Bank 1994). Most rural people depend
on wells, rivers, streams, ponds and lakes as their source of drinking water. Available
statistics also show that except for about four countries, most people have no access to
adequate sanitation; in some countries, only between 2 and 20 per cent of the rural dwellers
have access to sanitation. Access to power is also a major problem in the region. Less than
one-half of the households have access to electricity sufficient for at least lighting except in a
few countries, and in even in these countries electric supply breakdowns are frequent; ranging
from six per cent in Botswana to 57 per cent in Nigeria. With the exception of South Africa
(87) and Mauritius (56), the number of telephone exchange mainlines per thousand persons
ranges from one in Niger, Chad and Mali to 13 in Zimbabwe and 21 in Botswana. Reported
faults may rise to as high as 217 per 100 mainlines per year. With regard to roads the
percentage paved and in good condition is relatively low in many countries and the World
Bank estimates show that ‘Timely maintenance expenditure of $12 billion would have saved
road reconstruction costs of $45 billion in Africa in the past decade’ (World Bank 1994).
Thus, levels of infrastructure stocks in sub-Saharan Africa are woefully low in many
countries. According to the recent World Bank study,
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The per capita provision of infrastructure services has increased in all regions, the greatest
improvements have been in East Asia and the smallest in sub-Saharan Africa; reflecting the
strong association between economic growth and infrastructure (World Bank 1994).
This linkage is actually reflected in China’s success story of rural enterprise that employs
more than 18 per cent of the labour force and produces more than a third of national output.
This success has been achieved with a minimum amount of transport, telecommunications and
power at the village level.
In sub-Saharan Africa the levels of health infrastructure are also very low. The available
information shows that 60 per cent of the region’s population had access to health services
during the 1987-1990 period; the corresponding figure for the urban areas was estimated to be
87 per cent (UNDP 1993). Most rural people lack basic health facilities. In many rapidly
growing cities, expansion of health infrastructure is lagging behind population growth, which
exerts great pressure on the existing facilities. High population growth rates have therefore
contributed to the inability of African countries to expand, and, in some cases, even to
maintain existing levels of health facilities. For example, in Burkina Faso, the number of
health centres increased from 169 in 1980 to 860 in 1990; the number required in the year
2000 to maintain existing coverage, assuming one health centre serves 5,000 people, is 1,100
and to reach 60 per cent coverage is 1,400. In Mali the number needed to maintain the current
low level of coverage in the year 2000 is nearly five times the increase of 52 health centres
during the decade 1980-1990. Most countries face similar challenges and their population
growth has led to a decline in health service coverage. In Nigeria, for example, one study
found that in 1987 nearly 30 per cent of the equipment in health care institutions was not in
service and in Ghana in the same year, only 167 out of 660 of Ministry of Health vehicles
were roadworthy, 230 needed extensive repair, and 263 were worthless (UNDP/World Bank
1989). Hospital buildings in most African countries are in poor or unsatisfactory condition.
Some hospitals, for example, Tres de Agosto Hospital in Guinea Bissau, declined beyond the
point of repair (World Bank 1991) and in Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, Liberia and
Rwanda civil wars have damaged health infrastructures.
Regarding public health programs, most governments have not made much effort in
translating the principles of primary health care (PHC) into a national policy. Community-
based and intersectoral approaches to planning and operation of systems of health care have
either not been successful or have not been vigorously pursued. The available information
shows that in only five African countries have constraints in the enabling environment for
health been addressed. Most governments have embarked on selective public health strategies,
focusing on specific health problems such as immunization, tuberculosis and AIDS. Though
these programs have had a positive effect, they have not been successful in providing quality
care and promoting the use of specific interventions through social mobilization. The primary
health care model has not therefore been applied on an extensive scale as an instrument of
community development and as a result members of many communities have not been
involved in the promotion of a healthier environment for the urban poor and rural dwellers
(Gaisie 1989).
The above noted levels of economic infrastructure and of the existing health
infrastructure in most of the countries in the region show that the traditional African social
structures have not as yet changed much. Pursuit of good health and management or treatment
of illness therefore are difficult because they are intricately related to the socio-cultural and
economic structure of the society. The biomedical system has not as yet permeated the
African social fabric, nor has the ethnomedical system faded away: many Africans still
heavily depend on it for diagnosis and treatment of all kinds of maladies. The two systems are
yet to be integrated.
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It is clear that a country’s mortality level is determined by a complex network of factors
ranging from the levels of infrastructure through standard of education to cultural beliefs and
practices. Many of these factors are largely functions of a country’s cultural and historical
heritage. Mortality levels and trends are therefore not governed solely by technology but by a
plethora of cultural and socio-economic factors. The experience of some Asian countries such
as Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore is quite relevant here. Massive declines in mortality were
intimately bound up with very rapid economic growth and even where economic growth has
been slow but policies have been aimed at satisfying the basic needs of most of the people
(e.g. in Sri Lanka and Cuba), declines in mortality have been impressive. Thus, increasing the
income of the poor, and expanding schooling, especially for girls and women, contribute a
great deal to general household well-being and better health. But most African health systems
are riddled with problems such as financial constraints, misallocation of funds, inequality and
inefficiency that have hampered progress. Economic recession and structural adjustment
programs have also contributed to the slowing down of improvements in mortality levels and
progress in health; in consequence the movements through both health and mortality
transitions have also slowed down.
Fertility transition
Malthusian perspective and other demographic-economic models
Nearly two hundred years ago, Malthus in the Essay on the Principle of Population invited his
readers to accept the truth of two postulates: ‘that food is necessary to the existence of man’
and ‘that the passion between the sexes is necessary and will remain nearly in its present
state’.
These two laws, ever since we have had any knowledge of mankind, appear to have been
fixed laws of our nature, and, as we have not until now seen any alteration in them, we
have no right to conclude that they will ever cease to be what they now are, without an
immediate act of power in that Being who first arranged the system of the universe, and for
the advantage of his creatures, still executes, according to fixed laws, all its various
operations (Malthus, ed. Flew 1970:70-71).
He proceeded to draw inferences from the postulates and the associated assumptions. Among
the latter the most important was the inability of societies to increase food supply at more than
an arithmetical rate in contrast to the tendency of population to expand at a geometrical rate
unless checked. According to Malthus, poor countries would never be able to rise much above
their subsistence levels of per capita income unless they initiated ‘preventive’ checks on their
population growth. The only accepted means of preventing a birth was to exercise ‘moral
restraint’ which was defined as abstinence from marriage, either for a time or permanently,
from ‘prudential’ considerations, with a strictly moral conduct towards sex in the interval.
This was the only acceptable behaviour for keeping population on a level with the means of
subsistence and which was ‘perfectly consistent with virtue and happiness’. All other checks
resolved themselves into vice or misery. Thus, contraception, abortion and infanticide were
viewed as vices.
In the absence of such preventive checks, positive checks which included ‘all the causes
which tend in any way prematurely to shorten the duration of human life’ would inevitably
provide the restraining force. Among the positive checks listed by Malthus were bad and
insufficient food and clothing arising from poverty; bad nursing of children; a whole train of
common diseases; epidemics, wars, plague and famine. The positive checks which appear to
stem from the laws of nature he labelled ‘misery’ and those we bring upon ourselves such as
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excess of all kinds, wars and many others that are within our power to avoid he referred to as
‘vice’ and their consequences were ‘misery’. Malthus observed that a combination of some of
these checks keep population within the realm of natural law. In the Second Essay he wrote:
The power of population being in every period so much superior, the increase of the human
species can only be kept down to the level of the means of subsistence by the constant
operation of the strong law of necessity, acting as a check upon the greater power (Malthus,
ed. Flew 1970:250).
He believed that the cycle of increased food resources leading to population growth and
then to too many people for available resources reverting to poverty was part of a natural law
of population (the ‘Malthusian Trap’). The only way to break the cycle was to change human
behaviour, postpone marriage and sexual intercourse until a man was sure that he could
support his family and by that avoid the miserable consequences of population growth.
In the Malthusian demographic-economic growth model therefore, population growth is
seen as the dependent variable that is determined by technology as an autonomous factor in
relation to population change. According to this theory, population expansion comes to a halt
through increased mortality when the population reaches the subsistence limit of the newer
technology.
In contrast to this theory is the Boserup model, which is the opposite of that of Malthus:
population growth is here regarded as the independent variable that is a major determinant of
agricultural development. By gradual change from agricultural systems where long fallow
prevails to systems where no fallow is necessary, population within a given area can double
several times without facing either starvation or lack of employment opportunities in
agriculture. Boserup noted two mechanisms that are responsible for increase in output per
man-hour both in agriculture and non-agricultural rural activities: intensification of
agricultural activities may compel cultivators and agricultural labourers to work harder and
more regularly and increasing population density facilitates the division of labour and the
spread of communications and education (Boserup 1965). Thus, communities with sustained
population growth stand a better chance of undertaking viable economic development than
those with stationary or declining population. However, she added two caveats: (1) provided
the necessary agricultural investments are made; and (2) this condition may not be fulfilled in
densely populated communities, if the rates of population growth are high.
Boserup’s model implies that population growth stimulates economic growth under
certain conditions. Examination of the long historical processes of the changes in the
relationship between population growth and technology led her to conclude that rising rates of
population growth helped to accelerate the economic growth. Colin Clark (1957), the best
known exponent of the idea that population growth is the trigger of economic development,
points to the history of Europe in which industrial production and the increase in agricultural
production were accompanied almost universally by population growth. Clark’s argument is
based on the thesis that population growth is the motivating force that brings about the
clearing of uncultivated land, the draining of swamps, and the development of new crops,
fertilizers and irrigation technologies in agriculture.
Julian Simon (1977) joined the group by formulating a thesis that a growing human
population is the ‘ultimate resource’ for economic development. Inventiveness increases in
proportion to the number of brains trying to solve problems. Coal replaced wood as a major
source of energy only to be replaced by oil that may ultimately be replaced by solar or nuclear
energy. To Simon, innovation moves pari passu  with population growth, although moderate
rather than rapid or very slow population growth is most conducive to an improvement in
human welfare. In Europe, Japan and North America, there is a reasonable amount of
evidence to suggest that population growth is beneficial to economic development.
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Historical experience
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the early phase of modern economic development
in North Western Europe, population and income increases accelerated together. Declines in
mortality and, in some areas, increases in marriage rates as a result of new economic
opportunities, led to population growth. However, Europe’s rate of population growth rose
from 0.5 per cent to 1.5 per cent per annum and the natural increase seldom exceeded the
latter figure. In England it climbed to 1.6 per cent in the 1820s and in France it never rose
above one per cent during the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the natural increases were
partly siphoned off by emigration.
A similar demographic regime prevailed in Japan in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Population grew slowly and economic growth exceeded population growth so that
living standards gradually rose. Compared with Europe and Japan, North America, rich in
natural resources and with good economic opportunities, experienced fast population growth
in the nineteenth century. Fertility was relatively high and mortality was low; these conditions
together with heavy immigration from Europe led to a rate of population growth well above
two per cent per annum in the early 1800s. But fertility began to decline earlier than in Europe
so that the population growth rate fell below two per cent by the beginning of the twentieth
century. About one-third of the total growth in population during 1850-1910 was attributed to
immigration.
The European-American experience shows that population growth can be accommodated
or contained up to a point. In other words, under certain conditions moderate population
growth can be beneficial.
The developing world
As for the developing world, many experts regard the rapid population growth rates now
prevailing in much of Asia, Africa and Latin America as serious obstacles to efforts to
develop national economies and improve the general well-being of most of the world’s
people. In general, income levels rise faster in countries where population growth is occurring
moderately or slowly. Countries with rapid population growth must spend most of their
national income on providing necessities rather than using it for more productive purposes.
For instance, high growth rates increase the need and demand for all manners of public
services: welfare, education and health facilities and employment opportunities, causing
governments to divert capital to the provision of these services instead of investing it in more
productive endeavours.
The most acute economic crisis is encountered in sub-Saharan Africa. The consequences
of rapid population growth are compounded by economic crisis and environmental
degradation. Fall in per capita incomes, rapid increases in population, loss of export revenues,
curtailment of foreign investments, destruction of the fragile ecosystem and inability of many
countries even to feed their people and provide basic human needs lie at the heart of the
African dilemma. The available economic and social indicators show that the region has been
experiencing economic disasters for more than a decade and the prospects for the 1990s are
very bleak (see Table 4). The average annual growth rate of GDP of 3.6 per cent in the 1970s
declined to 1.8 per cent in 1992. With the exception of seven out of the 28 countries listed in
Table 4, population growth outstripped economic growth during the 1980s. The World Bank’s
estimates indicate that the GDP will be increasing at a rate between 0.3 and 0.5 (World Bank
1991). It is the only region where the World Bank projections indicate that the percentage of
the population living in absolute
354  S. Kwesi Gaisie
Supplement to Health Transition Review Volume 6, 1996
Table 4
Population and economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa, 1970-1992















Africa 2.8 3.6 3.0 1.8
Botswana 3.7 14.5 3.4 10.1
Benin 2.7 2.2 3.1 2.4
Burkina Faso 2.1 4.4 2.6 3.9
Cameroon 2.9 7.2 2.8 1.0
C.A.R. 2.2 2.4 2.6 1.1
Chad 2.0 0.1 2.4 5.3
C“te d’Ivoire 4.0 6.8 3.8 0.0
Congo 2.8 5.8 3.1 2.4
Ethiopia 2.6 1.9 3.1 1.2
Gabon 4.6 9.0 3.4 0.5
Ghana 2.2 -0.1 3.2 3.4
Kenya 3.7 6.4 3.6 4.0
Lesotho 2.3 8.6 2.7 5.4
Mali 2.1 4.9 2.6 2.9
Mauritania 2.4 1.3 2.4 1.9
Mauritius 1.5 6.8 1.1 6.2
Malawi 3.1 5.8 3.2 2.9
Niger 2.9 0.6 3.3 -0.7
Nigeria 2.9 4.6 3.0 2.3
Rwanda 3.3 4.7 2.9 1.4
Sierra Leone 2.1 1.6 2.4 1.3
Somalia 2.9 4.8 3.1 2.4
South Africa 2.7 3.0 2.5 1.1
Sudan 2.9 5.6 2.7 -
Tanzania 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1
Zambia 3.0 1.4 3.2 0.8
Zimbabwe 2.9 1.6 3.3 2.8
Source: World Bank 1994
poverty will rise from 47.8 per cent (216 million) in 1990 to nearly half of the total population
(49.7 per cent or 309 million ) in the year 2000 (World Bank 1992:30). The most threatening
of the problems noted above is the inability to feed ourselves in the face of abundant natural
capital, i.e. natural stocks that yield flows of natural resources and services, land and labour
being the crucial ones in food production. The food problems faced by sub-Saharan Africa
have been dramatized in three major food emergencies since the late 1960s: the Sahel
drought, 1968-1972; East and Southern Africa, 1970-1980; and Southern and East Africa in
1983-1984. The 1983-1984 food emergency affected as many as 24 countries which
experienced serious food problems. This was followed by another major food emergency in
1984-1985, affecting some 20 countries. The 24 countries include some that were affected by
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the 1991-1992 drought: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Chad, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ivory Coast,
Lesotho, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Swaziland, Togo,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and also countries with more chronic food problems such as Angola,
Somalia and Tanzania. In 1984-1985, food emergency countries were: Burkina Faso, Cape
Verde, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia,
Sudan, Tanzania, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. These
emergencies highlight Africa’s precarious agricultural situation.
Agricultural production has completely stagnated since the 1960s: the average annual
growth rate of agricultural production has been two per cent since 1965. Ethiopia (-0.1),
Rwanda (-1.5), Lesotho  (-0.7), Angola (-0.5), Namibia (-1.0) and Botswana (-4.0)
experienced negative growth rates during the decade 1980-1990 (World Bank 1992) while the
growth rates declined in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
The weak performance in food production has major implications for most African
countries, given high population growth rates of three per cent and above, and high
urbanization rates. Yet it appears it is on agricultural development, as it interacts with fertility,
mortality and rural-urban migration, that prospects of movement from the second into the
third stage of the demographic transition will largely depend.
Regulation of population growth
In his later writings, Malthus somewhat modified his stance on population response. He had
always recognized that ‘misery’ could be avoided, not just by undesirable ‘vice’ but by
‘restraint’, especially delayed marriage. Whilst Malthus-prescribed regulation of population
growth is located at the beginning of the reproductive period as ‘starting patterns’ such as
postponement of first sexual union and celibacy, regulation in African societies is situated in
the middle as ‘spacing patterns’ and the end as ‘stopping patterns’. These include the duration
of the non-susceptible period, duration of postpartum abstinence and early terminal
abstinence. These patterns of preventive checks are linked to patterns of kinship organization
and agricultural production. In traditional sub-Saharan societies women perform two crucial
functions; they are simultaneously major agricultural producers and procreators on behalf of
the corporate kinship groups. This dual function is institutionalized through normative
prescriptions relating to behaviour. The reproductive function is so crucial to both individual
women and their kinship groups that the status of adulthood for women is also completely
contingent on motherhood and the last instalment of bridewealth (lobola, bogadi) is often
transferred upon the birth of the first child. Among the Bemba and Luvale in Zambia, for
example, marriage is regarded as a means by which a woman’s fertility may be tapped for the
benefit of her matrilineage; fertility is emphasized in their rituals as a source of new members
for the matrilineage. Among the Tswana ‘It is her duty to bear and nourish children for him’
(Schapera 1966). Such was the typical institutional arrangement for reproduction.
Various combinations of nuptiality and child-spacing patterns have given rise to different
levels of fertility: total fertility rates of between six and seven are a common feature of West
African societies, and rates between five and eight in several parts of Tanzania and Kenya Rift
Valley are the outcome of shorter non-susceptible periods. In Southern Africa, a combination
of long postpartum non-susceptible periods, relatively late marriage and low rates of
remarriage with a fairly low proportion of childlessness has produced total fertility rates that
are low by African standards. Swaziland’s high estimated total fertility rate of seven is
attributed to less emigration by men and therefore less loss of exposure to pregnancy
(Lesthaeghe 1986).
Weakening of old preventive checks
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The information collected in the various fertility surveys including the recent Demographic
and Health Surveys in sub-Saharan Africa shows that the components of general exposure and
child-spacing have undergone some transformation. A pattern has emerged of reduced
postpartum non-susceptible period because of increases in the individual and contextual levels
of education. For instance, the 1979-1980 Ghana fertility survey data show that the rural areas
experience the longest durations of breastfeeding, postpartum abstinence, postpartum
amenorrhoea and the overall postpartum non-susceptible period, followed by the urban areas
and the cities. There is an inverse relationship between mean durations of postpartum
variables and the number of years the mother spent in school. For instance, the postpartum
non-susceptible period among women with no formal education is four months longer than
among primary and middle school leavers and seven months longer than among secondary
and tertiary graduates. The average durations of breastfeeding range from 21 months among
the women with no formal schooling to 18, 16 and 12 months among the primary, middle, and
secondary and over groups respectively (see Gaisie 1984).
In Zambia, a comparatively long non-susceptible period is noted among rural women and
those with no formal education while a second pattern of relatively moderate duration of non-
susceptibility and little use of modern and effective contraceptives is depicted by the data for
women with primary education and resident in the less urbanized provinces such as Eastern,
Central and Northern Provinces.
The third pattern of relatively short non-susceptible period is noted among urban women
with secondary or higher education and resident in the most urbanized provinces, Lusaka and
Copperbelt. The same patterns are noted among Tswana women. Durations of breastfeeding,
amenorrhoea, abstinence and non-susceptible periods are longer in the rural areas than in the
urban areas (Botswana 1989:17).
The African populations are therefore gradually passing through a first phase in the
modernization of their reproductive regimes as reflected by the changes in the levels of the
proximate determinants of fertility, a gradual weakening of the old preventive checks (i.e.
child-spacing) but this is not fully compensated for by the new checks of late marriage and
greater use of contraception. The only places where there is sufficient compensation for the
diminishing old checks are urban concentrations with high average education and better
educated zones located in the regional or provincial capitals. A decline in fertility usually
occurs among women with at least some secondary schooling while an education below that
level tends to produce more of an increase in lifetime fertility. All indications point to a
delayed second phase of the fertility transition, a phase characterized by falling general
fertility.
Social change and incipient fertility decline: the pace setters
Besides the need for significant changes in the fertility components themselves, certain
aspects of the social organization are likely to militate against early onset of the second phase
of the fertility transition. An important basic feature of the modernization of social groups in
Africa is the persistence and recrystallization of the various traditional structures. In
consequence, traditional or ethnic frameworks become the most important determinants of the
degree of adjustment to modern conditions including changes in reproductive behaviour. For
instance, aspirations towards higher standard of living and rising costs of childbearing are
compelling urban women in Lom‚, the capital of Togo, to limit their family size to four living
children. But many of these women use spacing and traditional methods such as periodic or
prolonged abstinence rather than stopping or modern contraceptives to achieve the preferred
family size. The emergence of alternative living arrangements under which the spouses live in
separate residences or compounds is another example of adaptive behaviour in changing
social and economic conditions (Ekouevi 1994:133-134). Rural Sierra Leoneans ‘adjust the
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timing or spacing of their births, rather than preventing births’ and families use diverting and
adaptive ways of managing the costs of childbearing rather than reducing fertility (see
Bledsoe 1994:130). There are various paths to social change and they are largely determined
by historical and socio-cultural factors (see Ekouevi 1994; McNicoll 1994).
In Botswana, labour migration, missionary activities and contacts with European traders
engendered many changes in the Tswana family. The closely knit co-operative socio-
economic unit was made economically less self-sufficient and was judicially and
administratively dismembered (Schapera 1947). Among the various factors labour migration
was the most devastating. Though it contributed to the general welfare of the people, it
undoubtedly weakened the family structure; most married migrants left their wives behind and
as a result migration led to a long period of separation of husband and wife. Young women
had to wait for several years after puberty before they were married. Labour migration also
spread infectious diseases and loosened sexual morals. Domestic control broke down with the
prolonged absence of the father in the mines; children tended to do much as they liked and
took little notice of their mother, especially if she had a lover. Schapera observed that ‘It is
possible however... that even more children would be born were it not for migration’
(Schapera 1947:129).
The disorganization of the family and associated changes in sexual and reproductive
behaviour contributed a great deal to the breakdown of the institution of marriage. According
to the 1991 Botswana Census results, 66 per cent of women aged between 20 and 44 years
had never been married; the corresponding figure for males between 25 and 54 was 59 per
cent. The proportion of women who had never married ranged from 88 per cent among the
20-24 year-olds to 39 per cent among the 40-44 year-olds. In the age group 30-34 years, seven
out of ten males had never married and nearly one-third of those in their mid-forties were
single.
Changes in the traditional family structure also led to the creation of a sizable proportion
of female-headed households. In 1991, 47 per cent of the households were headed by women
and 46 per cent of the female headed households had no cash earning members in the family,
only 43 per cent receiving money remittances from within and outside the country. The
proportion of the households in the urban districts headed by women ranged from 32 per cent
in Selibe-Phikwe to 41 per cent in Francis Town and the proportions with no cash earning
members ranged from eight per cent in Gaborone to 17 per cent in Francis Town and Lobatse.
The rural districts have the highest proportions of female-headed households. In
Ngwaketse district, 55 per cent of the households are headed by women and 60 per cent of
them have no cash earning members with only 24 per cent receiving remittances. In
settlements such as Lesenepole and Kalamare nearly seven out of ten households are headed
by women and between six and seven out of ten of these households have no cash earning
members.
The effect of economic development is manifest in various aspects of life. The per capita
GDP has increased by seven times since independence; rising from 578 Pula in 1966 to 4,115
Pula in 1988/1989 (Republic of Botswana 1991:13). The per capita GNP nearly quadrupled
between 1980 and 1992; increasing from US $792 to US $2,790 at an annual growth rate of
6.1 per cent (UNDP and World Bank 1989; World Bank 1994), the highest in Africa besides
Gabon.
Since the attainment of political independence, the government has been investing
millions of Pula a year in infrastructure. The result has been a substantial increase in roads,
power, water, telecommunications, sanitation, transport, education and health services.
Female schooling is an important feature of the Tswana society: nearly three-quarters of
the pupils enrolled in the schools in the 1940s were girls. The system of cattle management
under which boys had to spend a greater part of their youth at cattleposts was largely
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responsible for the wide gender gap in formal education (Schapera 1947). The proportion of
males aged five years and over who had left school increased from 16 per cent in 1971 to 28
per cent in 1981 and and 36 per cent in 1991. The corresponding figures for the females are
22, 35 and 41 per cent. However, the gender gap with respect to the educational level attained
has been rapidly closed over the past two decades. The proportion of males completing
secondary education increased from nine per cent in 1971 to 22 per cent in 1991 and that of
females rose from eight per cent to 23 per cent during the same period. In 1981 only 0.4 per
cent of females progressed beyond the secondary level compared with 1.3 per cent of males
but the 1991 census figures show that the gap has been substantially bridged with proportions
now at 3.8 per cent for males and 2.0 per cent for females.
Data on average parity at different levels of educational attainment show that fertility is
negatively related to level of education. A reported completed family size of between 6 and
6.6 children among women with between one and four years of schooling and those without
any formal education declines monotonically to 2.7 among the women with higher or tertiary
education. Such fertility differentials are characteristic of early stages of fertility decline and,
with the rapid expansion of female schooling in Botswana, a sustained reduction in fertility is
imminent.
The socio-economic development has been accompanied by movement of women from
occupational groups with little motivation to groups with strong motivation for family
limitation. The proportion of professionals among the women climbed from 7.4 per cent in
1981 to 13.4 per cent in 1991 and the proportion of administrators increased from 0.2 to 1.4
per cent. The proportion of clerical workers also rose from 4.6 to 9.6 per cent while sales and
service workers dropped from 19.4 to 12.6 per cent and those engaged in agricultural
activities from 62 per cent to 52 per cent. It is the change in the occupational structure and not
the increase in income that motivates a reduction of fertility. Motivation for family limitation
is much stronger among employed women than among the unemployed (Gaisie 1995:23).
In 1990, about 80 per cent of the rural villages had access to potable water and about 85
per cent of the rural population was within 15 kilometres of a health facility. The ratio of
doctors to population increased from 1:20,000 in 1965 to 1:5,804 in 1989 and that of nurses to
population from 1:17,000 to 1:554 during the same period. By 1989, the school enrolment
rates for primary and secondary school had risen to 90 and 30 per cent respectively. The 20km
of tarred roads in 1965 increased to 2,664km in 1990 and there were 8,328km of national
roads in that year. The number of telephone subscribers increased from 11,000 in 1985/1986
to 22,000 in 1989/1990 (Republic of Botswana 1991).
Besides providing infrastructure, the government also adopted various measures that have
facilitated the achievement of individual demographic goals though it does not have an
explicit population policy at the time of writing. Nonetheless, Botswana’s family planning
program is rated the strongest in Africa and one of the strongest among the developing
countries, ranking eighth after China, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Sri Lanka,
Indonesia and Mexico (Ross 1992:80).
Family planning services were offered as far back as 1973 on a relatively small scale and
it was not until 1980 that a concerted effort was made by the Ministry of Health to extend
integrated Mother and Child Health-Family Planning (MCH-FP) services on a daily basis at
clinics in all parts of the country. By 1988, 77 per cent of the clinics were providing these
services. In the second half of the 1980s training of health and family planning personnel
intensified, with the development of family planning guidelines, service standards and
manuals for family planning (see CSO 1984, 1988) It is therefore not surprising that a
significant decline in fertility began in the 1980s. The MCH-FP program made a substantial
contribution to the fertility decline. It facilitated changes in reproductive behaviour by
engendering a significant shift from traditional to modern methods of contraception. The
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proportion of all women who had ever used at least one modern method increased from 34 per
cent in 1984 to 54 per cent in 1988; the corresponding figures for women in unions are 37 and
60 per cent. During the same period the proportion of women currently using modern methods
rose from 16 per cent to 29 per cent. An explicit population policy and active involvement of
the government in the national family planning program would help to sustain the decline.
Recent estimates show that the fertility level appears to have remained fairly constant
during the 1970s with a Total Fertility Rate of 6.5 (see CSO 1972:175). The downward trend
began in the late 1970s and continued in the 1980s with the TFR dropping to 5.7 in 1988 and
5.2 in 1991. These estimates suggest that fertility declined by 11 per cent between 1981 and
1988 and by 8.8 per cent between 1988 and 1991 or a decline of about 19 per cent during the
decade (see Gaisie 1995); this figure is higher than the 10 per cent decline that is now
‘conventionally accepted as indicating an onset of irreversible fertility transition’ (Caldwell,
Orubuloye and Caldwell 1992:211).
Although Kenya adopted an explicit policy to reduce rapid population growth in 1967,
the country had to wait for two decades before beginning a fertility decline. The decline has
been attributed to ‘the increased use of contraception to control births’ (Brass and Jolly 1993),
a simplistic explanation that ignores completely other equally important factors in the
historical and cultural heritage as well as in government policies and programs which
transformed social and economic conditions in Kenya during the two decades following the
attainment of independence. The massive investment in physical infrastructure — roads,
transport, water, sanitation, communications — and in human capital such as education and
health was fundamental in creating the conditions that started the decline in fertility. Once
there are solid social and economic reasons for controlling births, people will use any methods
available. Economic reversal is a new candidate and should not be presented as the major
determinant of fertility decline (Mback‚ 1994). Transitory behaviour may change with
improvements in the economic performance.
In Zimbabwe, the significant social change that the traditional social system has
undergone mostly began as a response to the oppressive pre-independence conditions and the
organizational structure of the liberation struggle. The armed struggle, for instance, demanded
the use of contraceptives in the bush.
We have adopted what we want from Western culture into our revolution and we are aware
of the fact that people have sexual feelings in spite of the dangers of the struggle. It was
possible for us to get abortions. We had to face reality of the conditions we were in (Davies
1983).
The motivated women advised their male comrades that it was ‘necessary to use
contraceptives, and that to be sent back to Mozambique for five months to have a baby was a
set back to the war’. The young boys (mujibhus) and girls (chimbwidos) who acted as eyes
and ears for the freedom fighters and performed a network of secret functions for the guerilla
forces were also exposed to the changing environment.
The returning fighters had the onerous task of convincing their mothers and grandmothers
that the changed attitudes towards contraception and abortion were in the interest of the young
generation who had to spend a good part of their reproductive lives in the bush. The liberation
war also eroded some of the props of the low status of a female in the traditional society: ‘The
position of women has really changed through the armed struggle because now we have equal
positions and equal education’ (Davies 1983).
The organizational capacity developed during the war was also used in establishing a
variety of women’s clubs and co-operatives that were concerned, among other things, with
adult literacy, income generating and traditional ‘home economics’ activities. The Women’s
Bureau and Ministry of Community Development and Women’s Affairs provided the
structural framework for articulation and resolution of women’s social, economic and political
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issues (Mazur and Mhloyi 1994). Thus, shifts in the traditional social system because of the
effect of external forces, development of organizational capacity and a very strong political
will made a major contribution to the incipient fertility decline in Zimbabwe.
A rigorous analysis of the Zimbabwean data shows that there has been a modest decline
in fertility, from about 7.1 children per woman in 1985 to 6.5 in 1987/1988 (Udjo 1993:107).
A life table analysis of birth intervals shows that the decline is mainly in high-order births:
fifth to sixth and sixth to seventh births. Udjo also noted that in view of the ‘ineffective use of
contraceptive by single women that is evident from the high proportion of premarital births’
and the fact that a sizable proportion of women in the ‘reproductive age group never use
contraception (nor marry), any emphasis on currently married women in examining
contraceptive use is misleading and inappropriate’. Thus, the pattern of contraceptive use
during the family building process in Zimbabwe is consistent with the modest decline in
fertility (Udjo 1993:108).
However, the most important observation in the three countries is that the decline in
fertility has been, to a large extent, started by institutional changes that affect the reproductive
behaviour.
Integrated approach
The interrelationship between mortality and fertility as reflected in the demographic and
socio-economic developments in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Kenya suggests the desirability of
an integrated approach to the study of demographic trends in sub-Saharan Africa.
Mortality transition appears to have stalled and fertility transition is being delayed by lack
of substantial internal structural transformations. High mortality and high fertility are causally
linked in many ways. Durations of breastfeeding and postpartum abstinence, and the need to
replace children who have died in infancy all depend, to a large extent, on how long the infant
survives. Thus, when mortality declines the desired number of children also falls, but the
adjustment does not occur immediately because it takes some time before many people
become aware of the prevailing level of infant mortality. On the other hand, short birth
intervals, very early and very late childbearing, high birth order and large family size are
some of the factors that influence the probability of survival: mother’s and child’s health,
demands on mother’s time and that of her relatives are all associated with fertility levels. High
infant mortality and high fertility therefore interact with each other in many ways within
socio-economic and institutional contexts. An integrated assessment of mortality and fertility
processes throws much more light on the demographic transition as an aspect of the general
socio-economic development in sub-Saharan Africa.
European experience shows that profound political and economic changes, such as
industrialization, international trade and increase in the real value of wages, preceded and, as
it were, prepared the ground for the demographic transition of the last quarter of the
nineteenth century. There is a general observation also from European history that the pre-
industrial homoeostatic demographic regime was dislocated by a mortality decline and that a
decline in mortality is a necessary precondition of fertility decline (Chesnais 1992:399).
Furthermore, mortality decline appears to have been often, if not always, associated with the
spread of education, particularly among females. In sub-Saharan Africa, demographic trends
in Botswana and Zimbabwe as outlined above attest to the fact that developing basic
infrastructure and investing in the key social sectors such as health and education are
necessary conditions for declines in both mortality, especially infant mortality, and fertility.
The prevailing socio-economic conditions in most African countries make it extremely
difficult to critically assess the timing and the pace of sustainable demographic transition,
including even the movement through the mortality transition.
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Female primary school enrolment in the area increased from 44 per cent in 1970 to 58 per
cent in 1991. In the same period female secondary enrolment trebled from 5 per cent to 16 per
cent. The proportions of female primary school enrolment ranged from 93-121 per cent in
Botswana, Lesotho, Kenya and Cameroon to 21-24 per cent in Mali, Ethiopia, Guinea and
Burkina Faso in 1991. Universal primary education will be far beyond the reach of many
African countries for many years to come. In 1991, except in Botswana (57 per cent),
Zimbabwe (45 per cent), Uganda (35 per cent), Kenya (25 per cent), Lesotho (30 per cent) and
Ghana (29 per cent), less than one-quarter of girls of secondary school age (12-17 years) had
access to secondary education (World Bank 1994). Enrolment rates stagnated or fell in the
1980s in some countries that had been doing well. For example, gross enrolment rates fell
from 93 per cent in 1980 to 63 per cent in 1987 in Tanzania, and from 94 per cent to 76 per
cent in Zaire. Among women, only one in three in the subcontinent is literate. Massive
investment in human capital is therefore a major challenge in the years ahead.
As noted above, levels of health infrastructure stocks are low and declines in the existing
ones are slowing the mortality transition. The available data show that education and health
programs have come under severe financial pressure in the past decade. Although the share of
education and health expenditures in GDP increased slightly for the subcontinent as a whole,
in more than half of the countries for which data are available, public expenditure for
education and health as a percentage of GDP fell between 1980 and 1985. Besides limited
institutional and organizational capacity for delivery of education and health services as well
as other social services, the financial constraint is so severe that it would be difficult for most
countries in sub-Saharan Africa to provide these services without external assistance. The
implications for demographic transition are obvious.
Influence of development strategies
Governments in the Third World tend to influence fertility partly through programs designed
to promote or reduce fertility, and partly by their choice of development strategies. Most
countries in the South and East Asia region promoted both industrialization and agricultural
development. Consequently, they experienced large structural changes in both the urban and
the rural labour markets.
 In some Asian countries therefore, including Malaysia and Thailand, economic change,
increase in age at marriage and improvements in female status led to large declines in fertility
(Jones 1981); particularly in the urban formal sector. Asian countries pursued policies for the
resolution of problems of high population densities and high pressure of population on land.
When population growth accelerated in the period after World War II, governments became
concerned about how to achieve an adequate increase in food supply. Almost all of them,
therefore, promoted rural development and technological change in agriculture by provision
of credit facilities, subsidies and direct investments. The Asian type of agricultural
development places emphasis on irrigation, multi-cropping and labour-intensive methods and
as a result output per hectare increased and so did the demand for labour. Furthermore, a
number of Asian governments including India transformed tenants into owners and organized
settlement schemes in areas of relatively low population density. Though there was some
replacement of female and child labour by chemical and mechanical inputs, there is still a
demand for labour in small-scale agriculture. In Asia, occupational changes in the urban
market and rapid increase in the proportion of population living in large cities have been the
major causes of fertility reduction within the urban industrial enclaves. At the same time,
government promotion of rural development and fertility control motivated many peasants to
use family planning, including late marriage. Development strategies of most Asian
governments therefore contributed a great deal both to the reduction of fertility and mitigation
of the effects of increasing population on resources.
362  S. Kwesi Gaisie
Supplement to Health Transition Review Volume 6, 1996
African governments have also been interested in industrialization, but because of lack of
adequate capital, management problems and poor infrastructural facilities, efforts at
industrialization have not been successful. As a result only small proportions of their
populations have experienced structural changes such as shifts in occupational structure in the
urban areas. The African traditional system has undergone substantial changes, especially
since World War II. There have been, for example, structural transformations with respect to
land tenure and tendency towards private ownership, cash crop production, monetization of
the economy, modernization of technology, legal reforms and rapid urbanization. All these
modern transformations have been grafted upon a highly diversified set of older institutional
arrangements in kinship and economic organization and cultural systems. In this long process
of change, our farmers have not been particularly well integrated into the cash economy. They
cultivate crops destined for remote markets and make some use of purchased tools, chemicals
and wage labour. At the same time they continue to grow their own food supplies and
organize their work around hoe and cutlass technology and inherited kinship systems. Most of
the farmers are still engaged in subsistence agriculture, but with reduced fallowing and
increased fragmentation. Governments’ agricultural development programs often have a poor
record and have not managed to close the gap between food production and population growth
or to generate sufficient earnings to finance food imports. Technological progress in
improving staple food production has been limited. Production is predominantly rainfed so it
is difficult to cultivate improved seed varieties which have been developed predominantly for
irrigated areas. Local specific factors such as diseases, and soil types have limited the transfer
of improved varieties. Production is labour intensive, and labour is frequently the limiting
factor of production. Research and other institutions are ill-placed to supply effective small
holder technologies. The rapid population growth coupled with uneasy transition of resource
management from local communities (i.e. kin, lineage etc.) and chiefs to individuals or
governments, have increased the pressure to over-exploit grazing land. The difficult transition
from past subsistence farming to enhanced market orientation underpins, to a large extent, the
slow mortality transition and high fertility levels.
Development and population policies revisited
The rapid expansion of population in sub-Saharan Africa will have to stop somehow. We
have, at least, two options. It may stop as a result of return to high mortality due to
malnutrition, famine and poverty, or other disasters, perhaps stemming from the ‘tragedy of
the commons’. Or it may be stopped by the prevailing economic crises in many parts of the
subcontinent that will force families to accept family planning. The first possibility appears to
have been temporarily prevented by heavily subsidized food exports and food aid from
industrialized countries. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (1994)
figures show that in 1993, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa obtained most of their cereal
requirements as commercial imports and food aid: the proportions range from 44 per cent in
the Sahelian countries to 98 per cent in Southern Africa. In Eastern and Southern African
countries, about two-thirds of the requirements were acquired in food aid. Nearly one-half of
the Sahelian requirement was met with food aid. Food aid is, at best, a temporary measure and
can, at worst, be used as a political weapon. Food aid is somewhat similar to the poor laws of
England during the eighteenth century, which Malthus believed had the tendency to
increase population without increasing the food for its support... they may be said therefore
in some measure to create the poor which they maintain... A poor man may marry with
little or no prospect of being able to support a family in independence (Malthus ed. Flew
1970:97).
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 Roman state charity fed thousands of underemployed citizens on imported grain; a policy
that undermined Italian agriculture and kept a large population on the edge of subsistence,
thus promoting ‘disease, corrupt manners and concubinage’.
In the face of widespread poverty, malnutrition and high infant and child mortality in the
subcontinent, it cannot be denied that Malthusian positive checks are, to some extent,
operating. The forced acceptance of family planning is the second option that the subcontinent
may have to adopt in order to extricate itself from the Malthusian trap. Societies everywhere
at all times have provided distinctive solutions to the dilemma of population by manipulating
their moral and political economies and in the process largely avoided misery and abject
poverty. Africa appears to fit the Malthusian formulation better than the optimism of the
demographic transition model. And the region does not exemplify the Boserupian type of
technological adaptation generated by population pressure.
For the elimination of positive checks, that is, a return to high mortality because of
poverty, famine and malnutrition, and forced acceptance of family planning, a variety of
conditions must be fulfilled, two of which are the building of basic infrastructure and rural
development.
New development and population policies are therefore required. On the development
side, there is a need for a 180o turn in our choice of the required development strategy:
towards a pursuit of viable and sustainable rural development. Two broad policies are
required to attack the underlying causes of poverty, famine, and low status of women; neither
policy will be sufficient on its own. First, urban-industrial development and rural development
must be positively linked by correcting the lopsided or urban-biased industrial development
strategy, improving access to resources and technology, and promising equitable income
growth.
The more important policy relates to reduction of poverty: not only is attacking poverty a
moral imperative, but it is also essential for population management. The strong and growing
evidence of the links between poverty reduction and fertility makes a compelling case for
programs to reduce poverty and population growth. Policies justified on economic grounds
can deliver substantial demographic benefits. With prudent macro-economic policies that
promote balanced development in both urban and rural areas and equity in income
distribution, it is easier to change demographic behaviour. Expanding the access of poor
people to health and family planning facilities will help reduce population growth. And better
educated people can more readily adopt reliable and complicated family planning techniques.
Thus, strong macro-economic policies complement and reinforce population
management. But these policies are not enough to ensure sustainable development; strong
public institutions for implementation are also essential. Culture, religion, law and politics
affect institutions and these in turn affect the economy and in consequence stifle demographic
transition. Recent research suggests that the superior performance of Japanese manufacturing
stems partly from norms of behaviour that promote the flow of information between workers
and supervisors. Policy reforms and institutional changes are therefore required to bring about
accelerated balanced development and better population management. We should not,
however, underestimate the effect on Africa’s development of the international economic
order and its associated adverse effects.
There are policies targeted at specific development problems: diversification of rural
employment or economic opportunities to generate incomes for the rural poor households;
provision of infrastructural facilities including production and marketing incentives. A rural
development policy must seek a compromise between the labour-intensive and appropriate
modern input technologies in order to ensure sustained increase in employment opportunities
and rural per capita income.
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There is a need for an explicit and comprehensive population policy and strong family
planning and reproductive health programs. A recent study of the strength of the programs in
the region shows that out of 38 countries, only Botswana and Mauritius have strong programs
and five (South Africa, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ghana and Zambia) have moderate programs. The
majority of them have weak programs and the remainder have very weak programs or none at
all (Ross 1992). The failure of most of these programs to achieve their targets has been
attributed to a number of factors relating to supply and demand aspects of family planning
services, management constraints and lack of strong political commitment. The importance of
the role of culture in programs is either regarded as residual or not mentioned at all in most
evaluation studies undertaken by international organizations or individual scholars. But
lessons drawn from the Asian experience show quite unequivocally that culture affects nearly
all aspects of fertility and family planning.
One important aspect of the link between kinship and fertility is the area of relations
within the family. How much is the value of children to parents changing? In situations where
economic insecurity is widespread children may be the best insurance against risk; providing
among other things, substantial support to parents in their old age, stabilizing marriage,
assisting in production of food crops and determining the woman’s status in the society: her
prestige and power largely depend on the number of children she has borne. Such
unfavourable economic conditions make it difficult to implement a family planning program,
since women are unwilling to refrain from having large families under such conditions. In
rural Sierra Leone
It is less the case, then, that people are poor because they have many children; rather,
because people’s economic and political situations are so unstable, they need numerous
children (Bledsoe 1994:130).
Furthermore, lack of substantial change in family structures in respect of financial
management and decision-making, even among the urban middle class, is bound to affect the
implementation of family planning programs. It is perhaps important to reiterate that there has
not been any fundamental transformation of the economies of Africa, the pace of change in
family relations tends to be slow, kinship systems have proved resilient in their adaptation to
change and they have sustained people in new and critical life situations in towns and cities.
Family planning programs in sub-Saharan Africa have been influenced by this pattern of
social change. Modern contraceptives are a facilitating agent; they are not structural agents of
social change, and as observed by McNicoll, ‘means of contraception and ways of delivery
are secondary issues’ in fertility reduction enterprises (McNicoll 1994:218).
The challenges ahead
The demographic trends in Africa should be assessed from the perspective of its historical and
cultural heritage and international economic environment and their continuing effects. With
deep-rooted structural deficiencies, limited institutional and organizational capacity, limited
financial resources, inadequate economic infrastructure, underdeveloped human resource
base, low levels of health and education infrastructure stocks and heavily urban-industrial
based development strategies, movement through the demographic transition is a difficult
task. Mortality declines have been stalled by economic crises and attendant structural
adjustment programs have increased rather than decreased the number of Africans living in
abject poverty. Massive declines in mortality will be brought about by rapid economic
development and policies designed to satisfy the basic needs of the greater number of the
people. The region therefore needs substantial investment in the key social sectors such as
health and education. Restructuring of health systems to enable health for all is needed for
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rapid movement through the mortality transition; tempo and period of completion are not easy
to forecast under the existing health and economic conditions.
Regarding fertility transition the unknown quantities in the equation are many. It is quite
evident from history that fertility decline is a matter of motivation. Fertility had declined in
certain societies without the use of modern contraceptives. Fertility decline can therefore
occur without family planning but it cannot occur without socio-economic development. A
World Bank study shows that the effectiveness of birth control programs is determined by
factors preceding program efforts, and not by the particular methods used (Faruquee 1979).
Motivation to use contraceptives is determined mainly by the extent to which the advantages
of large family size are eroded by transformation in the socio-economic structures.
In those countries where the fertility rate is reported to be falling, overall population
growth rates are relatively high; indicating that fertility rate is still high and in consequence
the balancing of the demographic ‘deficit’ will take some time. Total fertility rates in
Botswana, Zimbabwe and Kenya are around four children per woman. The fertility declines in
these countries are still too recent to provide any basis for establishing an African pattern or
determining the general duration of transition. The Tunisian case shows it is necessary to be
cautious about assessing fertility transition in Africa. Though fertility has declined as a result
of technological and economic change, the ‘strength of the traditional cultural value of the
family has prevented the realization of a completed fertility transition’ (Stamm and Tsui
1986). The prevailing socio-economic structures still influence reproductive behaviour in
many ways. Fertility is governed by many different factors and its decline in different
societies may be started by a differing combination of factors. The types of demographic
transition in sub-Saharan Africa in the twenty-first century or beyond are likely to be
associated with different patterns of socio-economic development, about which we are still
ignorant.
Theoretical frameworks and social science research.
The theoretical frameworks within which the policies and programs are conceived are
woefully inappropriate. Most accounts of African societies written by social scientists are
incomplete and inadequate to explain the nature of social change in Africa. Admittedly, the
range of assumptions made about the cultural realities has been extended and, in some cases,
modified, but little effort has been made to develop theories that clarify the roots of African
social systems. Even studies supposed to be of theoretical interest tend to be out of touch with
African realities. For example, the application of ‘modernization’ and ‘dependency’ theories
to the African situation encounters a number of analytical problems. Both theories focus on a
generalized linear model of socio-economic development which does not sufficiently
incorporate the interaction between local and national forces. But the role played by local
forces in the process of social change is very important to the development of theories that
incorporate the fact that African social structures are complex entities comprising ‘traditional’
and ‘modern’ sectors.
Our inadequate understanding of the nature of the African societies as they are today
shows the weakness of the existing theoretical frameworks. Similarly demographic transition
theory is inadequate to explain social change and offer guidelines for monitoring and
understanding future structural change in the African social systems. This then leads me to the
relevance of social science research in the subcontinent. The neglect of anthropological and,
to some extent, sociological research methodologies in the 1960s in favour of quantitative
methodology gave rise to ill-founded optimism concerning demand for family planning
services in Africa south of the Sahara. The data on which were based the reports
recommending family planning programs to governments did not reflect the major and
essential features of the social systems including different types of household arrangements,
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and people’s real attitudes and reproductive behaviour. Demographers and other social
scientists have over the past few years realized the importance of combining quantitative and
qualitative research methods to provide not only quantitative parameters but also explanation
of the relationships between these parameters. The combined approach enables the researcher
to understand not only the patterns but also the process of change; it yields accurate
information on behaviour and a meaningful interpretation of what lies behind the behaviour.
We know that there is strong correlation between education and fertility or between the
education of the mother and infant and child mortality, but we do not have much information
about the mechanisms through which education exercises such a profound influence.
Another example is the transition from poor to good health. We need to understand how
the use of particular medical technology, such as prenatal care, affects health outcomes. This
is critical in determining the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of possible interventions
designed to improve health. We also have to analyse the reasons why people decide to use
these interventions. Studying the determinants of behaviour is essential in evaluating the
effectiveness of policies designed to get people to use the interventions effectively. Such an
investigation takes us into the realm of social, cultural and behavioural determinants of health;
beliefs and practices that account for illness and poor health as well as good health. The
micro-approach is an effective instrument for explaining the links between variables, and for
capturing the nature of socio-economic change. Furthermore, the approach enables us to
explain the persistence of certain traditional structures and the emergence of new patterns of
differentiations and social inequality. Many dimensions of pluralism together with cultural
conservatism and resilience make African societies more complex and diverse than those in
other parts of the world. This is why studies on Africa conducted on the basis of concepts and
definitions derived from the study of other societies have not yielded useful results (Aryee
1994; Bledsoe 1994).
African universities and research institutions therefore have a major role to play in the
collection and analysis of the needed data for assessing demographic trends and their
entangled relationships with social and economic development. Unfortunately, an assessment
of human resources development programs in Africa shows that training of future researchers
is far from satisfactory. For instance, the United Nations Regional Institute for Population
Studies (RIPS) which recruits students from about 20 member countries has produced only 28
M.Phil. and four Ph.D graduates during its 21 years of existence. The Francophone
equivalent, IFORD, has no Ph.D program and the Cairo Demographic Training Centre which
serves mainly North African countries has just started one.The situation is no better in the
universities concentrating on undergraduate programs. For example, the University of Ghana,
one of the oldest universities on the continent, produced 14 Ph.D and 31 M.Phil. graduates
between 1986 and 1992 (Aryee 1994). Though research institutes such as the Institute of
Statistical, Social and Economic Research (University of Ghana), Nigeria Institute of Social
and Economic Research (University of Ibadan), and National Institute of Research (University
of Botswana) have successfully undertaken a number of valuable research projects, their
capacities for multidisciplinary social science research need to be improved. These research-
oriented institutions do not seem to have had any significant effect on socio-economic
development because of inadequate funding, weak institutional linkages and the absence of
clear national policy guidelines. And as Aryee points out, one major handicap of these
institutions is lack of
A comprehensive national policy or programme... imperative in directing attention to the
most relevant issues, coordinating and monitoring research activities, and ensuring
maximisation of scarce resources. It may also act as a central information management
centre compiling directories or inventories of all on-going research and disseminating such
information (Aryee 1994:48).
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Lack of funding for research activities has constrained the development of social science
in the region. The problem has been examined by Aryee:
The problem of inadequate funding can be ameliorated in part by strengthening and
widening the range of institutional linkages between research institutions and the private
sector, industry, non-governmental organizations etc. many of whom have a direct interest
in applied research. There must also be more collaboration and coordination between the
national research institutions themselves, many of whom tend to work in relative isolation
or independence (Aryee 1994:55).
It is high time however, that the organizations interested in population and sustainable
development issues and therefore funding population activities in Africa take local research
much more seriously. Small research grants to local universities to conduct relevant and
needed research on national demographic and socio-economic issues would enhance our
knowledge about the demographic developments in sub-Saharan Africa.
Conclusion
This paper has stated that sub-Saharan Africa is not only an economically but also a
demographically challenging region. At the theoretical level it is still struggling to develop
appropriate paradigms; it is necessary to reorientate research strategies, redesign effective
research instruments, and guide and streamline research activities by comprehensive national
research policies. Strengthening human resource development programs and broadening the
base of funding from both external and internal sources are also major issues.
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